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Abstract 
This paper examines the relationship between unconventional monetary policy and the US 
banking performance. Unconventional monetary policy is captured through the central bank’s 
assets and excess reserves. Results show that unconventional monetary policy has a negative 
relationship with bank performance. Further analysis shows that the negative association 
between unconventional monetary policy and performance is mitigated for banks with a high 
level of asset diversification and low deposit funding. We also find that the negative 
relationship between unconventional monetary policy and performance subdues for deposit 
insured financial institutions. Finally, we use dynamic panel threshold analysis which reveals 
that the negative association between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance 
is particularly pronounced above the reported threshold value.  
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1. Introduction 
Responding to the financial meltdown in 2008, the Federal Reserve (Fed) in the US has been 
actively engaged in monetary expansion of immense proportions. Only as part of the Fed’s 
large-scale asset purchases (LSAPs) programmes, trillions of the US long-term Treasury bonds 
and mortgage-backed securities (MBS) were purchased over the 2008-2013 period. It does not 
come as a surprise, therefore, that a lot of emphasis has been placed by academics and policy 
makers alike on understanding the impact of unconventional monetary policy (Joyce et al., 
2012; Miles, 2014; Svensson, 2014). Along these lines, there has been a growing literature that 
examines the effect of interest rates on the risk-taking of banks (Delis et al., 2011; Altunbas et 
al., 2012; Fungacova et al., 2014; Buch et al., 2014; Ioannidou et al., 2015). This paper tries to 
bridge a gap in the existing literature by examining the underlying relationship between the 
unconventional monetary policies (UMPs), as measured by central bank’s assets and excess 
reserves, and the performance of the US commercial and saving banks controlling for bank-
specific and country-level variables. 
Although, there is a large volume of empirical literature regarding the broader economic impact 
of UMPs, there is rather limited evidence with regards to the relationship between UMPs and 
bank performance (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). Mostly, since the 
first round of the Fed’s asset purchases in 2008, numerous studies offer explanations on the 
effectiveness of UMPs on asset prices, interest rates and a number of other macroeconomic 
variables (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012; Wright et al., 2012; 
Kapetanios et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012; Swanson et al., 2014; Rogers et al., 2014; Bowman 
et al., 2015). Some studies employ high frequency data and look at the impact of the Fed policy 
announcements on long term interest rates (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et 
al., 2012; Wright et al.,  2012; Swanson et al., 2014) sovereign yields, stock prices and foreign 
exchange rates (Rogers et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015). Other studies look at the impact of 
UMPs on output and inflation (Kapetanios et al., 2012; Chen et al., 2012). Some other studies 
also investigate the association between UMPs and financial stability (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 
2013; Chodorow-Reich, 2014). Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2013) examine the effect of UMPs on 
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corporate risk for commercial and investment banks over the 2008-2011 period. They conclude 
that UMPs increase corporate risk for the period under study. Similarly, Chodorow-Reich 
(2014) examines the effect of UMPs on risk-taking for a sample of insurers, and mutual funds 
from 2008 to 2013 period. The author finds some evidence of positive association between 
UMP and risk for the 2010-2013 period. The reported positive impact of UMP on bank risk-
taking lends empirical support to the ‘portfolio balance’ channel that is introduced by Tobin 
(1963, 1969).2   
Turning now to the effect of UMPs on bank performance this could be explained through its 
impact on bank’s interest margins which is an important source of bank profitability. Bank’s 
interest margin reflects the net interest income that arises from the difference between the short 
term (deposit) rate and long term (lending) rate (Delis and Kouretas, 2011). When the Fed has 
initiated UMPs, the short term interest rate has already reached the zero lower bounds. 
Furthermore, expansionary monetary policies decrease long term interest rates consistent with 
previous empirical studies (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; D’Amico et al., 2012; Wright 
et al., 2012; Swanson et al., 2014). Therefore, a reduction in the long term interest rates due to 
UMPs would decrease the difference between these long term interest rates and the short term 
interest rates that would consequently supress the interest margins. The extant literature points 
to two channels that UMPs, particularly LSAPs, could reduce long term interest rates. One is 
the ‘portfolio balance’ channel according to which the Fed’s LSAPs could affect the long term 
interest rates through the reduction of the amount of long-term assets that the private sector 
holds (Gagnon et al., 2011; Joyce et al., 2012). The second is the ‘signalling’ channel through 
which LSAPs could signal to market participants that the Fed has changed its views on policy 
preferences. This in turn might change bond investors’ expectations of the future short term 
interest rate resulting in lengthening the period of the near-zero federal fund rate. The 
‘signalling’ channel would decrease long term bond yields by reducing the average expected 
short-rate which is component of the long term rates (Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013).  
2This theoretical framework, is particularly relevant in the case of LSAPs, in which financial institutions are 
engaged particularly and thus ‘portfolio balance’ theory is a core mechanism that could explain the impact of 
UMP on bank risk (Steeley, 2015). Tobin (1963, 1969) suggests that central banks could decrease the relative 
returns of financial institutions by shifting supplies of assets with different maturities and liquidity due to 
imperfect substitutability. In particular, when a central bank buys assets from banks, the amount of cash that 
financial institutions hold increases. Since cash is not a perfect substitute for assets, banks  would put emphasis 
in rebalancing their portfolios by purchasing assets that are better substitutes and offer higher yield (Joyce et al., 
2012; Kapetanios et al., 2012). These assets would comprise riskier assets than cash, such as stocks and bonds 
that in turn would increase the undertaken risk of banks (Fisher, 2010; Fratzscher et al., 2014). 
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However, the empirical evidence on the effect of UMP on bank profitability is rather scarce. 
In particular, we know of only two studies that focus on the underlying relationship between 
UMPs and bank performance (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014). 
Montecino and Epstein (2014) find that LSAPs, as proxied by a ‘counterparty treatment 
variable’, increase bank profitability but this effect is robust only for the large US banks. 
Furthermore, Lambert and Ueda (2014) investigate the impact of UMPs, as captured by the 
central bank’s assets over gross domestic product (GDP) ratio, on bank profits for a sample of 
the US commercial banks over the 2007Q3-2012Q3 period. They find that UMPs exert a 
negative effect on bank performance and thus they raise questions concerning the effectiveness 
of expansionary policies on the performance of financial institutions.  
These two studies (Montecino and Epstein, 2014; Lambert and Ueda, 2014) do not find a strong 
positive association between UMPs and bank performance. Unconventional monetary policies 
took place in the US after the burst of the financial crisis aiming to boost the wider economy, 
thus when one examines the impact of these policies on bank performance should take into 
account also the regulation framework that is particularly associated with the deposit runs of 
banks. In detail, as a response to the financial crisis, numerous countries increased significantly 
the coverage of their financial safety nets aiming to prevent potential contagion defaults in the 
banking sector. In particular, a recent study by Anginer et al. (2013) shows that during periods 
of normal economic conditions, deposit insurance has a negative impact on bank stability, 
while over periods of economic crisis, deposit insurance coverage exerts a ‘stabilization effect’ 
on banks. Therefore, when we examine the relationship between unconventional monetary 
policy and bank performance, we should also control for the effect of the deposit insurance 
coverage particularly during economic downturns when contagious bank defaults are more 
likely to take place.  
The paper contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Firstly, we shed new light on 
the underlying relationship between the UMPs and bank performance as estimated by a number 
of accounting ratios for a sample of US commercial and saving banks over the 2007Q2-2013Q2 
period. Secondly, we test whether the association between UMPs and bank performance varies 
based on different levels of bank asset diversification and deposit funding. Thirdly, we examine 
how deposit insurance coverage relates to the performance of banks over this period, while we 
also test whether the relationship between UMPs and bank performance changes for Federal 
Deposit Insurance Coverage (FDIC)-insured institutions. Finally, we use a dynamic panel 
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threshold methodology to identify possible threshold-effects of UMPs with respect to bank 
performance over a period of significant structural changes for banking institutions as well as 
for the entire economy.  
Our findings suggest a negative relationship between UMPs, as proxied by central bank’s asset 
and excess reserves, and the US bank performance over the 2007Q2- 2013Q2 period. The 
cross-sectional variation identification strategy illustrates that the negative association between 
UMPs and performance is more pronounced for banks of low level of asset diversification and 
high deposit funding. In addition, the negative relationship between UMPs and bank 
performance is moderated for the FDIC-insured institutions. Lastly, the dynamic panel 
threshold analysis demonstrates that the negative association between UMP and bank 
performance is particularly enhanced above the identified threshold value of UMP that 
classifies two regimes.  
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the hypotheses to be tested. 
Section 3 introduces the data, while section 4 discusses the methodology and the results. 
Section 5 concludes. 
2. Hypotheses to be tested. 
In this section we develop the three main hypotheses of our study; i) the first tests the 
relationship between the unconventional monetary policy and bank performance ii) the second 
examines the association between the deposit insurance coverage and performance iii) while 
the third looks at the relationship between UMPs and bank performance for deposit insured 
banks. We test these propositions for a sample of the US commercial and saving banks over 
the crisis period (2007Q2-2013Q2).  
2.1. Unconventional Monetary Policy and Bank Performance 
The existing literature on the relationship between UMPs and bank performance is rather 
limited, while there is a large discussion on the impact of monetary policy via interest rates on 
net interest margins of banking institutions. Following the hypothesis advanced by Samuelson 
(1945), known as the ‘Samuelson effect’, changes in interest rates affect bank performance, and 
more specifically profitability, via their effect on bank’s interest margins. In other words, when 
interest rates are very low, banks’ revenues from loans decline, while banks’ interest expenses 
from saving deposits do not decrease to the same extent, because banks’ portfolio consist 
primarily of demand and transaction deposits. Similarly, Hancock (1985) shows that an 
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increase in interest rates boosts bank profitability, as lending rate elasticity is larger than the 
deposit rate elasticity. Trying to bridge a link between UMPs and interest margins is imperative 
to understand the effect of the non-standard monetary policies on the lending interest rates that 
banks charge borrowers. It is established in the literature that UMPs, particularly via LSAPs, 
decrease long term interest rates and thus decrease the difference between the federal fund rate 
(deposit interest rate) and lending interest rates (Gagnon et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). 
Therefore, due to the documented larger elasticity of the lending rate compared to the deposit 
rate (Hancock, 1985), the reduction of lending interest rates could consequently lead to a faster 
decrease in revenues than interest expenses arising from deposits. This in turn would depress 
net interest margins and affect negatively bank performance. 
Furthermore, one of the leading theoretical models for the determination of interest margins is 
the bank dealership model as developed by Ho and Saunders (1981). According to this model, 
banks are risk-averse financial intermediaries that face inventory risk which arises from the 
mismatch between liabilities and assets. This risk has to be compensated via the pure interest 
spread, the difference between loan and deposit rates. Ho and Saunders (1981) suggest that the 
interest margin is dependent, among others, on the volatility of interest rates signifying that 
high interest rate volatility increases interest margins. A subsequent study by McShane and 
Sharpe (1984) argues that bank’s interest margin is positively related to interest rate volatility. 
In support to the above argument, Maudos and Guevara (2006) confirm empirically a 
significant positive relationship between interest rate volatility and interest margins. Following 
previous findings (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and 
Rudebusch, 2013), UMPs, particularly via LSAPs, decrease lending interest rates. This in turn 
suggests that the difference between lending and deposit interest rates declines. As a result, 
when interest rates decrease they tend to converge to zero-low bounds and consequently 
interest rate volatility reduces. Indeed, Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen (2011) find that UMP 
decreases interest rate volatility as captured by the implied volatility on swaptions. Therefore, 
decreases of interest rate volatility over expansionary monetary periods could have a positive 
association with interest margins and bank profits as in Maudos’s and Guevara (2006) study.  
Apart from the impact of expansionary monetary policies on interest based income, UMP could 
also affect the performance of banks through its effect on non-interest income that stems from 
trading financial assets. Banks include in their portfolio loans and other assets such as 
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securities, commodities and derivatives held for trading. On the positive side, central bank 
purchases might increase asset prices through the ‘portfolio balance’ channel (Tobin, 1963; 
Vayanos and Vila, 2009). According to this mechanism, bank managers and investors do not 
consider cash as a perfect substitute of the MBS and Treasury-bills that bank sell to the Fed. 
Thus, banks are incentivized to use these cash holdings to purchase high return assets such as 
equity and bonds (Tobin, 1963; Vayanos and Vila, 2009). This in turn raises the demand of 
trading assets and their prices and would result in portfolio gains stemming from the trading 
activities of banking institutions. Also, another view suggests that LSAPs reduce the market 
uncertainty and boost the market participants’ confidence in economic projections (Wright, 
2012) that might result in the increase of asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 2014). On the contrary, 
via the ‘signalling’ channel the Fed’s purchases might indicate that economic and financial 
prospects would deteriorate and this might have a negative effect on asset prices and bank 
portfolio gains (Christensen and Rudebusch, 2013).    
Another mechanism through which unconventional monetary policy could affect bank 
performance is through its impact on the funding cost of banks. Banks could benefit from near-
zero policy rates that would decrease the cost of deposit funding (Lambert and Ueda, 2014). 
Turning now to the other form of bank’s funding, wholesale funding cost could also be reduced 
as a result of the unconventional monetary policies. Wholesale financiers discipline banking 
institutions by charging them with higher interest rates than retail depositors do (Calomiris, 
1999). However, the Fed’s LSAPs are considered by market participants as injection of cash 
to depository institutions and an implicit guarantee for the well-functioning of the banking 
industry (Montecino and Epstein, 2014). In support of this argument, Santos et al. (2014) find 
that banks benefit from a cost advantage with regards to raising funding in the bond market, as 
investors believe that they are too big to fail and thus they would discount risk and reduce 
borrowing cost. Therefore, during non-conventional monetary policies banks could benefit 
from a reduction in interest rates charged by wholesale financiers. Other studies (Gagnon et 
al., 2011; Gilchrist and Zakrajsek, 2013), find that banks that issue bonds as a form of long 
term debt can benefit from lower funding costs as LSAPs decrease bond yields. Additionally, 
the Fed’s purchases of Mortgage Backed Securities (MBS) from depository institutions, 
suggest that the central bank might have subsidised banks’ funding cost to fund these 
mortgages (Kandrac and Schlusche, 2015). 
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Based on the above discussion there is no clear indication of the effect of UMP on bank 
performance, thus the hypothesis H1.A and the competing proposition H1.B are formed as 
follows: 
H1.A (H1.B): The effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance is negative 
(positive). 
2.2 Deposit Coverage Insurance, UMP and Bank Performance  
To date, the existing literature is inconclusive with regards to the relationship between deposit 
insurance coverage and bank performance. On the one hand, insured depositors might charge 
lower deposit rates due to the presence of insurance protection (Peria and Schmukler, 2001; 
Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2004). This reduction in deposit rates due to the presence of 
deposit insurance would lead to lower funding costs and this in turn would increase banks’ 
interest margins (the difference between lending and deposit rates) and thus performance. In 
the absence of deposit insurance coverage, monitoring of banks by private parties increases 
and thus uninsured depositors tend to discipline banks by demanding higher deposit rates 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Kane, 2002; Anginer et al., 2013). Moreover, deposit insurance could 
also impact the lending rates positively, as bank managers might lend to customers of low 
creditworthiness suggesting that they would require higher interest rates for the loans provided 
(Carapella and Giorgio, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). This could suggest that deposit 
insurance coverage might have a positive impact on bank profitability through its effect on 
interest margins. On the other hand, when deposit insurance is in effect, the relaxation of credit 
standards and monitoring procedures could result in a higher level of loan losses, thus reducing 
profits and net interest margins (Abreu and Mendes, 2002).  
Based on the above discussion there is no clear indication of the effect of deposit insurance on 
bank performance, thus the hypothesis H2.A and the competing proposition H2.B are formed 
as follows: 
H2.A (H2.B): The effect of deposit insurance coverage on bank performance is negative 
(positive). 
Drawing from the arguments in the previous section (2.1), one major channel through which 
expansionary monetary policy could affect bank performance is through reduction in the 
interest margins that arises from the decrease in lending rates when the short term rate (fed 
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fund rate) is close to the zero lower bound (Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 
2013). The reduction in net interest margins could be more pronounced for uninsured banks. 
This is so as uninsured depositors discipline banks by charging higher deposit interest rates 
(Anginer et al., 2013). On the contrary, if deposits are insured, depositors lack incentives to 
monitor and consequently charge lower interest rates on deposits (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Huizinga, 2004). This reduction in interest margins because of the monitoring of depositors 
could be strengthened for deposit uninsured banks. Moreover, at the presence of lower margins 
over unconventional monetary policy periods, insured banks are encouraged to relax further 
their credit standards because of lack of private monitoring and thus increase lending to 
borrowers of low creditworthiness (Carapella and Giorgio, 2004; Ioannidou and Penas, 2010). 
However, as discussed earlier, lower credit standards for deposit insured institutions might lead 
to a higher loan default rate that could result in bank losses (Abreu and Mendes, 2002). In this 
case, the negative (positive) effect of UMP on performance would be strengthened (moderated) 
for banks with deposit insurance coverage. 
Based on the above discussion hypothesis H3.A and the competing hypothesis H3.B would be 
formulated as follows:    
H3.A The positive (negative) effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance is 
strengthened (moderated) for deposit insured institutions. 
And  
H3.B: The positive (negative) effect of unconventional monetary policy on bank performance 
is moderated (strengthened) for deposit insured institutions. 
3. Data and Variables 
 
We use quarterly financial data from the Fitch IBCA's Bankscope database for a period that 
covers the financial crisis 2007Q2-2013Q2. Our final sample includes 6771 US commercial 
and saving banks and a total of 88,888 observations, after removing errors and inconsistencies. 
Table 1 describes all dependent and explanatory variables employed in the empirical analysis.  
 
[INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
3.1. Unconventional monetary policy and deposit insurance coverage variables 
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Since 2009, the Fed has conducted numerous LSAPs rounds that include primarily Treasury 
securities and mortgage-backed securities (MBS). In 2014, the Fed purchased almost $2.5 and 
$1.7 trillion of Treasury securities and MBS respectively. This had, as a result, the expansion 
of the Fed's balance sheet by almost five times compared with the size of it before the crisis. 
Consequently, UMPs, through LSAPs, have increased substantially both the asset and liability 
side of the Fed’s balance sheet. A number of previous studies highlight that the size of central 
bank’s assets is an appropriate measure of UMPs and indeed is found to influence the prices of 
specific assets in previous studies (Greenwood and Vayanos, 2010; Gagnon et al., 2011; 
Hamilton and Wu, 2012; D’Amico and King, 2013; Gambacorta et al., 2014), while Lambert 
and Ueda (2014) demonstrate its significant effect on the profitability of the US banks. 
Similarly, we use the natural logarithm of central bank’s assets (CBA) to capture the expansion 
of the Fed’s balance sheet from the asset side.  
Moreover, the expansion of the liability side of the Fed’s balance sheet due to the initiation of 
the LSAPs has led to a significant increase in excess reserves held by banks (Todd, 2013).  
Excess reserves stand for the extra amount of reserves against deposits and other liabilities that 
banks hold above the required reserves that the federal law suggests. In particular, excess 
reserves increased sharply since the late 2008 in the US. In 2007, excess reserves averaged 
$1.9 billion, while by April 2014 reached around $1.863 trillion, of which only around $115 
billion are required reserves. This large increase in excess reserves is reflected by its high 
standard deviation (1.04) over the period under study 2007Q2-2013Q2. Moreover, this 
substantial growth in excess reserves has also been driven by an important policy change; since 
2008 the Fed has started to pay interest on reserves. This, in turn, has encouraged banks to 
maintain a large amount of excess reserves. In addition, paying interest on reserves allows the 
central bank to put a floor on the federal funds rate, as banks would be hesitant to lend out their 
reserves at rates lower than those that they can earn from the Fed (Kozicki et al., 2011). This, 
in turn, offers the ability to the Open Market Trading Desk, ‘the Desk’, at the Fed to maintain 
the federal fund rate very close to the Federal Open Market Committee’s (FOMC’s) target rate 
(Federal Reserve Bank of New York, 2013). Therefore, we also use as a second proxy of UMP, 
the natural logarithm of excess reserves (EXC_RES) as in Bech’s and Monnet (2013) study.  
[INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
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Additionally, in order to account for the effect of the deposit insurance coverage, we employ a 
comprehensive dataset that provides bank-specific information on all the FDIC-insured 
institutions. Also, it offers valuable evidence on the particular date that a bank has gained 
access into the FDIC that in turn captures time heterogeneity.3 Thus, we include a dummy that 
takes the value of 1 for those banks (and years) that deposits are insured, while takes the value 
of 0 for these banks (and years) that do not have access to the FDIC. The increase of deposit 
insurance coverage is particularly evident the recent years by the mean value of the FDIC 
dummy variable that is equal to 0.65, thus, more than the half of our sample includes FDIC-
insured financial institutions (Table 2).   
3.2. Control Variables 
We employ a number of bank-specific control variables consistent with a number of previous 
empirical studies. We use the natural logarithm of total assets to proxy for the size of each bank 
(SIZE). The existing empirical evidence on the relationship between size and bank performance 
is mixed (Altunbas et al., 2001; DeGuevara and Maudos, 2007). On the one hand, bank size 
might have a positive relationship with bank performance due to higher diversification benefits 
(Mester, 1993). On the other hand, according to the literature, bank size could be related 
negatively with bank performance if economies of scope and scale are not realized. We also 
include the equity over total assets ratio to account for capital (E/TA), as in previous studies 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). The association between the E/TA ratio with 
bank performance could be positive, as more capital at risk prompts managers to undertake less 
risky positions that in turn would protect banks from increased losses (Gorton and Rosen, 1995; 
Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Lepetit et al., 2008). On the other hand, an increase of leverage, 
which implies a decrease of capital, might have a positive relationship with bank performance 
under the ‘agency cost’ hypothesis introduced by Jensen and Meckling (1976). This is because 
increases of leverage (decreases of capital) could moderate the conflicts that shareholders and 
managers have with regards to the risk of an investment choice (Myers, 1977). When leverage 
increases the priority of managers is to secure funding to pay the debt rather to undertake 
extremely risky projects (Myers, 1977). Hence, high leverage (low capital) might be correlated 
positively with bank performance, consistent with Berger and Bonaccorsi di Patti (2006). We 
also account for the relationship between liquidity, as estimated by the ratio of liquid assets to 
3We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer for pointing out the necessity to use an informative measure of 
FDIC that would enable us to capture bank and time heterogeneity. Data for all the FDIC-insured institutions are 
available here: https://www5.fdic.gov/idasp/warp_download_all.asp.  
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total assets (LIQ/TA), and bank performance. Previous empirical studies show that the 
association between liquidity and performance could be positive due to the lower liquidity risk 
(Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 1999; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). However, there is evidence 
to suggest that this relationship might be negative since high liquidity might be associated with 
low returns (Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007) and high storage expenses (Kwan, 2003). 
Furthermore, we opt for the ratio of loans to total assets (LA/TA) consistent with previous 
studies (Pasiouras, 2008; Lin and Zhang, 2009; Garcia-Herrero et al., 2009; Bertay et al., 2013). 
Lastly, we also account for the insolvency risk as estimated by the Z-SCORE= (1+ROE)/σROE, 
where ROE is the return on equity and σROE is the estimate of standard deviation of ROE (Boyd 
and Graham, 1986). Higher values of Z-SCORE for a bank indicates higher distance from 
default and therefore we expect that increases of Z-SCORE would have a positive correlation 
with bank performance consistent with numerous previous studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Delis 
and Staikouras, 2011).  
Turning now to the rest of the control variables, we opt for a number of macroeconomic 
variables to capture the general economic conditions.4 Thus, as proxies of macroeconomic 
stability we include in our regressions gross domestic product growth (GDP gr) and inflation 
(INFL) consistent with previous studies (Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010; Chortareas et al., 
2011; Kalyvas and Mamatzakis, 2014). On the one hand, there is empirical evidence to support 
that favorable economic conditions, i.e. high GDP gr, are related positively with banking 
expenses owing to higher operating costs to offer a particular level of services (Dietsch and 
Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Also, banks tend to increase their lending through shifting to riskier 
assets aiming to rise their returns. This in turn might dampen bank performance in the long run 
(Delis and Kouretas, 2010). On the other hand, GDP gr might be correlated negatively with 
banking costs due to the easy access that banks have to new technologies in prosperous 
countries (Lensink et al., 2008). Lastly, we also include the ratio of non-performing loans to 
total loans at the US state level (NPLs), in order to capture the state-specific credit risk.5  
Regarding the relationship between inflation and bank performance, Revell (1979) claims that 
it depends on whether bank’s salaries and other operating expenses could increase at a faster 
(lower) degree than the inflation rate. Thus, if a bank’s management could predict the inflation 
4We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer who proposed to introduce variables such as GDP growth, 
inflation and unemployment rate, aiming to capture the effect of general economic conditions on bank 
performance. 
5For the state-level non-performing loans ratio we obtained the data from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. 
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rate, a bank could adapt interest rates in order to increase revenues faster than costs and hence 
improve bank performance. In contrast, if bank managers could not accurately predict the 
inflation rate that would not result in appropriate adjustment of interest rates. In that case, bank 
costs would increase at a higher level than earnings resulting in the reduction of bank 
performance. Moreover, we include as another measure of economic conditions the 
unemployment rate (UEMP). The association between UEMP and bank performance is 
expected to be negative, consistent with Abreu and Mendes (2002). We also control for the 
interest rate policy in our regression model, including the federal fund rate (Fed rate). The 
relationship between the Fed rate and bank performance is expected to be positive. In 
particular, lower interest rates are positively related with risk-taking (Ioannidou et al., 2009; 
Brissimis and Delis, 2009; Jimenez et al., 2013) that in turn might dampen bank performance. 
4. Methodology and Results 
4.1.1 Fixed effect estimator 
As a first step of the empirical analysis we run the following general model with the fixed effect 
estimator: (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑐𝑐 + 𝑎𝑎1(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎2(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 +𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�          (1),                                                                    
where (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the vector of bank-specific measure of the US bank performance 
proxied by four different variables; 1) return on assets (ROA), 2) return on equity (ROE), 3) 
pre-tax operating income as a percentage of the average total assets  (POI), 4) and net interest 
margin (NIM). 𝑐𝑐 is the constant term, (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃)𝑡𝑡  stands for the unconventional monetary policy 
independent variable. (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is a dummy variable that captures the deposit protection and 
takes the value of 1 for the FDIC-insured banks, otherwise it takes the value of 0. (𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 
comprises a number of bank-specific, state-level and country-level control variables, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the 
unobserved bank-specific effect, while 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic error term. 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2 and 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 
are the parameters to be estimated. 
Fixed effect estimator is an appropriate method in the context of our study as we use a panel 
dataset.6 In particular, with fixed effect estimation we take into account heterogeneity across 
banks as it allows unobserved bank-specific characteristics, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, to be arbitrarily correlated with 
6We use the Hausman (Hausman, 1978) test that rejects the null hypothesis, suggesting that the fixed effect 
estimator (and not random effect) is the preferred estimation method.   
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the observed explanatory variables (Baltagi, 2008). Therefore, bank fixed effects, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖, capture 
heterogeneity across banks as bank-individual characteristics are not constrained and could  
impact upon the predictor variables. Fixed effect wipes out the impact of time-invariant 
characteristics and hence we could examine the underlying relationship between UMPs and the 
rest of our explanatory variables with bank performance. 
4.1.2 Fixed effect panel results 
The fixed effect estimations reveal that the unconventional monetary policy, as estimated by 
two different proxies, has a negative relationship with bank performance in support of our H1.A 
hypothesis. In particular, unconventional monetary policy, as measured by central bank’s assets 
(CBA), has a negative relationship with bank performance across all different performance’s 
measures specifications (ROE, ROA, NIM, POI). In some detail, 1% increase of CBA is 
associated with a 0.890 percentage points decrease in ROE. Similar results we observe when 
we use excess reserves (EXC_RES) as an alternative measure of UMP. Also, the EXC_RES 
has a negative association with bank performance at the 1% level across all our regression 
models (Table 3). Similarly to the CBA specification, if EXC_RES increases by 1% we expect 
a 0.707 percentage points decrease in ROE. Mostly, we observe that CBA has a stronger 
negative association with bank performance compared to that of EXC_RES and performance. 
Overall, these findings reveal that there is a negative relationship between UMP and bank 
performance. These results do not identify directly the exact channels through which UMP is 
related negatively with bank performance. Based on our discussion in the hypotheses section, 
some potential mechanisms could be in play. Briefly, over the monetary expansionary periods, 
the deposit rate (federal fund rate) has been kept at zero lower bounds. Also, previous studies 
find that unconventional monetary policy, through LSAPs, has led to the reduction of lending 
rates (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 
2013). Thus, based on that channel, UMP could affect bank performance through the 
depression on interest margins. Another channel through which UMP could be associated 
negatively with bank performance is through its effect on bank asset prices. Market participants 
could regard Fed’s purchases as a signal of deterioration of financial prospects which could 
affect adversely the value of the trading assets and thus the portfolio gains of banks 
(Christensen and Rudebusch, 2013).     
[INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
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Turning to the other variable of our main interest, we observe that federal deposit insurance 
coverage (FDIC) has a negative relationship with bank performance as estimated by different 
accounting-based indicators across all our specifications. In some detail, the relationship 
between deposit insurance coverage and performance is negative and significant at the 1% level 
across the majority of our regression models (see Table 3) lending support to the H2.A. This 
evidence is consistent with the existing literature that loan losses of deposit insured institutions 
could increase due to relaxed credit standards, thereby increasing costs and depressing interest 
margins (Abreu and Mendes, 2001).   
In addition, we go a step further and investigate the association between the interaction term 
of UMP and deposit insurance coverage with bank performance. Our results show that the 
negative relationship between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance, as 
discussed above, is less pronounced for FDIC-insured financial institutions. In some detail, the 
interaction of the deposit insurance coverage with the two alternative measures of UMP, 
CBA*FDIC and EXC_RES*FDIC, enters the regressions positive and significant (Table 3), 
suggesting that the negative association between UMP and bank performance is moderated for 
FDIC-insured banks lending support to the H3.A hypothesis. This relationship is more 
pronounced for those specifications where we employ EXC_RES as a measure of UMP. 
Overall, our findings show that the negative relationship between UMP and bank performance 
is somewhat smaller for the FDIC-insured banks. Although our regression model does not 
detect the exact mechanism through which UMP could be associated positively with 
performance of FDIC-insured institutions, a potential reason for our result could be that 
depositors of FDIC-insured banks might lack incentives to monitor banks and thus they charge 
lower deposit rates compared to that of non-insured depositors (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 
2004).   
Turning to the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we find that there is a positive 
association between size (SIZE) and bank performance as estimated by the ROA, ROE, NIM 
and POI ratios.  Our finding is consistent with previous literature and thus a potential reason 
for this result could be that bank size could offer diversification benefits through economies of 
scale and scope (Mester, 1993). In addition, we find that the loans over total assets ratio 
(LA/TA) has a positive and significant  relationship with bank performance at the 1% 
significance level (see Table 3). Our results are also consistent with these of previous empirical 
studies (Isik and Hassan, 2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Lensink et al., 2008). 
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We also observe that E/TA ratio has a positive relationship with bank performance across all 
the relevant specifications (see Table 3). More specifically, this relationship is significant at 
the 1% level when ROE and ROA are used to proxy for bank performance (see Table 3). Our 
finding is consistent with the ones of Athanasoglou et al. (2008) and Lepetit et al. (2008). A 
potential reason for this result could be that high level of bank capitalisation might be 
associated with profitable managerial positions which could reduce bank losses as explained 
by Gorton and Rosen (1995). Additionally, we find that LIQ/TA ratio has a negative 
relationship with bank performance. This evidence conforms with previous studies (Kwan, 
2003; Pasiouras and Kosmidou, 2007). 
Moreover, we examine the relationship between insolvency risk, as calculated by the Z-
SCORE, and bank performance. Our findings demonstrate, that there is a positive relationship 
between the ZSCORE and bank performance at the 1% significance level (see Table 3). Our 
empirical results are in line with a number of previous studies (Lepetit et al., 2008; Barry et al., 
2011; Delis and Staikouras, 2011). One potential reason for this result, according to the 
literature, could be that banks with high default risk (lower Z-SCORE) divert resources from 
day-to-day to monitoring operations that in turn could increase bank expenses and thus reduce 
banks’ profitability (Berger and DeYoung, 1997). Lastly, we observe that there is a negative 
relationship between NPLs and bank performance at the 1% significance level across the 
majority of our specifications (see Table 3).    
Regarding the country-level control variables, we find that GDP growth (GDP gr) has a 
negative relationship with bank performance consistent with previous studies (Yildirim and 
Philipatos, 2007; Delis and Kouretas, 2010). A potential reason could be that higher operating 
expenses to supply a given level of services might be associated with prosperous economic 
conditions (Dietsch and Lozano-Vivas, 2000). Moreover, we find that inflation (INFL) is 
related negatively with bank performance in line with previous empirical evidence (Wallich, 
1977; Petersen, 1986; Lozano-Vivas and Pasiouras, 2010) and literature which suggests that if 
bank’s management could not accurately predict inflation rate and consequently could not 
adjust interest rates equivalently, bank expenses increase at a faster pace than revenues 
suggesting the decrease of bank profits (Revell, 1979). We also observe a negative association 
between unemployment rate (UEMP) and bank performance as in Abreu’s and Mendes (2002) 
study. Finally, we find a positive and significant relationship between the Fed rate and 
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performance consistent with previous studies (Ioannidou et al., 2009; Brissimis and Delis, 
2009; Jimenez et al., 2013). 
 
 
 
 
4.2.1 Dynamic panel estimations 
As a second step, we test our main hypotheses (H1, H2 & H3) by employing the two-step 
‘system’ GMM estimator (Arrelano and Bover, 1995; Blundell and Bond, 1998) as in the 
Lambert’s and Ueda (2014) study. The usage of this estimator is appropriate in the context of 
this study as it accounts for endogeneity issues.7 Moreover, the well-documented persistence 
in bank profits (Goddard et al., 2004) is controlled by the inclusion of the performance lagged 
dependent variable amongst the rest of the determinants (Athanasoglou et al., 2008). We also 
follow the finite sample correction introduced by Windmeijer (2005) as the two-step estimates 
of standard errors tend to be downward biased (Blundell and Bond, 1998). 
The dynamic panel model that we use takes the following form: (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = �𝑐𝑐 + 𝜑𝜑(𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1 + 𝑎𝑎1(𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃)𝑡𝑡 + 𝑎𝑎2(𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +
∑ 𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗(𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 +𝑛𝑛𝑗𝑗=1 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖+𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡�                                                                                                (2), 
where (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the vector of bank-specific measure of the US bank performance as 
proxied by ROA, ROE, POI and NIM, while  (𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡−1  stands for the lagged 
performance independent variable. (𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑈𝑃𝑃)𝑡𝑡  is the variable that captures the unconventional 
monetary policy. (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  is a bank-specific dummy variable that accounts for the deposit 
protection and takes the value of 1, while takes the value of 0 for non FDIC-insured institutions. (𝐷𝐷𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 includes bank-specific, state-level and country-level control variables, 𝑣𝑣𝑖𝑖 is the 
unobserved bank-specific effect, while 𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 denotes the idiosyncratic error term. 𝜑𝜑, 𝑎𝑎1, 𝑎𝑎2 and 
𝛽𝛽𝑗𝑗 are the parameters to be estimated.  
4.2.2 Dynamic panel results 
7For the ‘system’ GMM estimation we use Roodman (2006)  “xtabond2” specification in Stata. 
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Table 4 shows the regression results of the dynamic panel analysis with the central bank’s 
assets and excess reserves, as unconventional monetary policy variables. The suitability of the 
usage of the two-step ‘system’ GMM estimator is justified by the significant lagged dependent 
performance variables in all the corresponding models (see Table 4). In addition, with respect 
to statistical diagnostics, we observe that the second-order autocorrelation in second 
differences and the Hansen test are insignificant (see Table 4).  
[INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
Similarly to the fixed effect specifications we observe that UMP, as proxied by CBA and 
EXC_RES, has a negative and significant relationship with bank performance (see Table 4). In 
some detail, 1% increase of CBA and EXC_RES is associated with a 0.581 and 0.102 
percentage points decrease in ROA respectively. Largely, we find that the negative association 
between CBA and bank performance is stronger in magnitude compared to that of the 
performance with EXC_RES. Our evidence lends further support to our fixed effect results. A 
potential reason for the negative association between UMP and bank performance, given our 
discussion on the hypotheses section, could be that UMP lead to the reduction of lending rates 
consistent with previous studies (Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 
2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Also, we observe a negative relationship between deposit 
insurance coverage and bank performance. Moreover, the interactions of the deposit insurance 
coverage with UMP, as calculated by CBA*FDIC and EXC_RES*FDIC, have a positive 
association with bank performance suggesting that the negative relationship between UMP and 
bank performance is less pronounced for the FDIC-insured institutions (see Table 4). In 
addition, we find that the CBA*FDIC has a stronger in magnitude relationship with bank 
performance compared to the association between EXC_RES*FDIC and performance. Overall, 
we find supportive evidence of the fixed effect findings.  
Regarding the rest of the bank-specific control variables, we observe that the results are 
consistent with the fixed effect specifications. In some detail, we observe a positive relationship 
between the SIZE of the bank and performance (see Table 4) consistent with Mester (1993). 
Furthermore, we find that the LA/TA ratio is positively associated with bank performance (see 
Table 4), as in the fixed effect specifications and previous empirical evidence (Isik and Hassan, 
2003; Casu and Girardone, 2004; Lensink et al., 2008). In addition, consistent with the fixed 
effect estimator, we find that the ZSCORE has a positive relationship with bank performance 
across all our models (see Table 4), in line with previous empirical evidence (Lepetit et al., 
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2008; Barry et al., 2011; Radic et al., 2012). Finally, we also observe a negative relationship 
between NPLs and bank performance (see Table 4). Moreover, we find that GDP gr, INFL and 
UEMP are associated negatively with bank performance as in fixed effect specifications and 
previous empirical evidence. Finally, the Fed rate enters the regression positive and significant 
confirming our previous findings (4.1.2).  
 
4.3 The relationship between UMPs and bank performance for banks of different asset and 
funding structure. 
In this part, we report findings regarding the relationship between UMP and bank performance, 
whilst taking into account two main US bank-specific characteristics: i) the asset diversification 
and ii) the total deposit funding.8 We split the sample accordingly: banks below the 25th, 
between the 25th and the 75th percentile and banks above the 75th percentile. So, we employ 
three models based on these subsamples, banks of the low, medium and high level of asset 
diversification and deposit funding.9  
Our main motivation for this analysis arises from the fact that the US banking institutions are 
well-diversified institutions in terms of both funding and asset structure. Previous empirical 
evidence suggests that interest based income that stems from loans is less volatile compared to 
the income that stems from non-interest bearing assets, such as derivatives and securities (see 
DeYoung and Roland, 2001; Lepetit et al., 2008). Similarly, banks that rely on trading activities 
experience higher losses compared to financial institutions that focus on traditional banking 
operations (Brunnermeier et al., 2012). Also, DeJonghe (2010) demonstrates that banks that 
engage particularly in non-interest based operations are vulnerable to changes in 
macroeconomic conditions. These findings illustrate that banks of various levels of asset 
diversification might react differently to changes in the macroeconomic environment, 
including unconventional monetary policies. Moreover, banks that rely more on non-deposit 
8We would like to thank an anonymous Reviewer for highlighting the importance of asset and funding structure 
for the US bank performance. We measure asset diversification by using the following formula: asset 
Diversification=1-|(Net loans - Other earning assets) / Total earning assets|, consistent with Laeven and Levine 
(2007). For the level of deposit funding we use the ratio of total deposits over total assets as in Beltratti and Stulz 
(2012). 
9Note that we sort the data with respect to the first year, opting for measures of asset diversification and deposit 
to asset ratio to take into account the intrinsic characteristics of the US banks. In that way, we avoid any 
endogeneity issue arising from bank’s management decisions driven by the macroeconomic conditions including 
non-conventional monetary policies. 
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funding than deposits could face higher funding costs as wholesale funders could impose 
enhanced monitoring and could withdraw their financing faster than depositors (Demirguc-
Kunt and Huizinga, 2010). Some studies argue that market funding would affect negatively the 
stability of financial institutions in the event of liquidity shocks (Adrian and Shin, 2008; 
Brunnermeier, 2008; Diamond and Rajan, 2009). This is so as banks that rely particularly on 
deposits are exposed to lower risk of drying-up in liquidity due to explicit (deposit insurance 
coverage) and implicit government guarantees (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga, 2010; 2013). 
Given that previous findings suggest that differences in funding structure matter, it is important 
to examine whether there is variability on the relationship between UMP and performance of 
banks of different funding structure. It is, therefore, of interest to investigate whether the cross-
sectional variation in the asset diversification and funding structure would affect the association 
between UMPs and bank performance. We employ a dynamic panel analysis to exploit the 
cross-sectional variation of our data.10 We include time effects in our models implying that we 
investigate cross-sectional differences of the relationship between UMPs and bank 
performance eliminating time variations.11 This strategy is similar to that of other previous 
empirical studies that highlight the importance of cross-sectional variation in identifying 
differences in the relationship between UMPs and bank characteristics (Becker and Ivashina, 
2014; Chodorow-Reich, 2014; Foley-Fisher et al., 2014; Bowman et al., 2015).   
 
Table 5 reports that UMP has a negative association with bank performance across all the three 
different subsamples; banks of low, medium and high level of asset diversification. Thus, 
across all subsamples we find that UMP is related negatively with bank performance, with the 
economic significance of this association being similar across banks. Note that there is some 
variation on the significance level of the observed relationship among the three regression 
models. In some detail, the interaction of central bank’s assets and asset diversification 
(CBA*ASSETDIV) has a negative and significant relationship with bank performance at 5% 
level in the medium and low level of asset diversification banks, and at 10% in the high level 
10As in the previous sections (4.2.1 and 4.2.2), we use two-step system GMM estimation following Arellano and 
Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) aiming to account for both endogeneity issues and the documented 
persistence of bank profits (Berger et al., 2000; Goddart et al., 2004; Athanasoglou et al., 2008). We also use a 
finite sample correction as developed by Widmeijer (2005) as two-step estimates are likely to be downward biased 
(Blundell and Bond, 1998). Additionally, we use Hansen diagnostic test of overidentifying restrictions and the 
second order autocorrelation test of residuals introduced by Arellano and Bover (1991).  
11We also run the regression including the bank specific and macroeconomic variables (excluding time dummies) 
and we find qualitatively similar results. These findings are available upon request.  
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of asset diversification. In particular, 1% increase of CBA*ASSETDIV leads to a 0.316 and 
0.301 percentage points decrease in ROA for the low and medium subsamples and a 0.289 
percentage points decrease for banks of high level of asset diversification. A similar picture 
arises from the regression results where we employ the interaction of excess reserves with asset 
diversification (EXC_RES*ASSETDIV). The relationship between UMP and performance 
remains negative across all banks, but it is significant at 1% and 5% for banks that fall within 
the low and medium level of asset diversification respectively. As a consequence, from a 
statistical standpoint, the negative relationship between UMP and bank performance is 
somewhat less pronounced for banks of high level of asset diversification. These results are in 
line with previous studies where UMPs are found to reduce lending rates and thereby to lower 
the difference between lending and deposit rates (Gagnon et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). 
Given that banks of low and medium asset diversification rely majorly on interest margins for 
their profitability, a reduction of interest margins would be of importance for the performance 
of financial institutions as a whole. Although, the relationship between UMP and bank 
performance remains negative for banks of high level asset diversification, i.e. those of high 
share of non-interest based activities, it is less pronounced from a statistical standpoint.12   
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
Turning now to Table 6, we observe that the negative association between the interaction of 
central bank’s assets with deposit to assets ratio (CBA*DEP/TA) and bank performance has 
higher economic significance compared to the results in Table 5, where asset diversification 
has been taken into account. Our findings are consistent with previous studies that find that 
unconventional monetary policy, through LSAPs, is negatively associated with interest rates 
and thus closely related with deposit-taking activities (Gagnon, et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; 
Krishnamurthy and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013).    
Table 6 reveals that for banks of high level of deposit funding, that is banks in the subsample 
12Thus, banks of high level of asset diversification would not be statistically affected by UMP as those banks rely 
on non-interest related assets. As previously discussed in the hypotheses section, UMPs could restore market 
uncertainty (Bekaert et al., 2013; Roache and Rousset, 2013) and increase asset prices (Gambacorta et al., 2014). 
Any positive effect of UMP on asset values could also be explained by the portfolio rebalancing theory (Tobin, 
1963; Vayanos and Vila, 2009). Based on this theory, banks receive cash from the central bank and use these 
proceeds to buy trading assets such as securities. This in turn will give rise to the demand of these assets and 
increase their prices suggesting gains for banks of high level of asset diversification. Thus, those institutions that 
engage particularly in non-interest based assets are less adversely affected by UMP compared to banks of medium 
and low asset diversification.   
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of high level of deposits to total assets ratio, there exists a stronger negative relationship 
between UMP and performance, as measured by CBA*DEP/TA, both in terms of economic 
and statistical significance compared to banks of either low or medium level of deposits to total 
assets ratio. In particular, CBA*DEP/TA has a negative association with performance of banks 
in low deposit to total assets subsample, but this is significant at 10%. Also, 1% increase of 
CBA*DEP/TA is associated with a 0.920 and 0.673 percentage points decrease in ROA for the 
high and medium subsample and a 0.836 percentage points decrease for the low subsample. In 
a similar vein, the association between the interaction of excess reserves with the deposit to 
assets ratio (EXC_RES*DEP/TA) and bank performance is negative and significant at 1% only 
for banks in the subsample of high level of deposit to total assets ratio. In the subsample of low 
deposits to total assets ratio, again, this relationship is significant but only at 10%. Therefore, 
for banks that rely particularly on wholesale funding this might mitigate the negative 
relationship between UMP and bank performance.13   
[INSERT TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
4.4.1 Dynamic Panel Threshold Model  
As a further step, we opt for a dynamic panel threshold model that enables us to identify any 
regime shifts due to UMPs. In some detail, we build on the dynamic panel threshold model of 
Kremer et al. (2013) based on the cross-sectional balanced panel threshold methodology 
introduced by Hansen (1999). This model identifies changes in coefficients of the main 
regressors of our interest, whilst it detects thresholds and thereby different regimes 
endogenously. In addition, the dataset information would allow to reveal if and when there is 
a break in the data generating process, rather than imposing arbitrarily a structural break in the 
data as in Klapper and Love (2011) and Anginer et al. (2014). This is of importance as, during 
the period of our sample, there is a major financial crisis, but to this date, it is not clear when 
commercial and saving banks were affected by the crisis. Our model identifies thresholds for 
central bank’s assets and excess reserves and their relationship with bank performance over the 
period of our study (2007Q2-2013Q2). Based on this estimation technique, we would be able 
13As we discussed in the hypotheses section (2.1 Section), wholesale financiers could charge higher interest rates 
than retail depositors aiming to discipline banking institutions (Calomiris, 1999). UMPs could restore wholesale 
financiers’ confidence, as injection of cash to depository institutions function as an implicit guarantee for the well-
functioning of the banking industry (Montecino and Epstein, 2014). This in turn suggests that banks of higher 
level of wholesale funding than deposit funding could benefit more from a reduction of funding cost over 
expansionary monetary periods.  
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to identify the exact date of the structural break, and detect possible shifts (see Hansen 1999; 
Kremer et al. 2013).    
The threshold model takes the following form14: 
𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 + 𝜆𝜆1𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝛾𝛾� + 𝛿𝛿1𝛪𝛪�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 ≤ 𝛾𝛾� + 𝜆𝜆2𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 𝐷𝐷�𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 > 𝛾𝛾� + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡             (3), 
 
where 𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 is the dependent variable and stands for the ROA. 𝜇𝜇𝑖𝑖 is the bank-specific 
fixed effect, while 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 stand for the two reverse regression slopes based on the 
assumption that there exist two regimes, 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is the random error. 𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 is a vector of explanatory 
variables that include bank-specific, state-level and country-level control variables. 𝛿𝛿1 is the 
regime dependent intercept as introduced by Bick (2007) and its inclusion is essential for 
estimating both the threshold value and the coefficient magnitudes of the two regimes. 𝐷𝐷 stands 
for the indicator function suggesting the regime specified by the threshold variable 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡 and the 
threshold value 𝛾𝛾. 
The 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗  takes the following transformation: 
𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡∗ = � 𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡+1  �𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 − 1𝑇𝑇−𝑡𝑡 �𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖(𝑡𝑡+1) + ⋯+ 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑇𝑇��                                                                       (4)   
In the equation (3) the threshold variable is 𝑞𝑞𝑖𝑖𝑡𝑡, and herein refers to the two measures of 
unconventional monetary policy; i) central bank’s assets and ii) excess reserves. 𝛾𝛾 is the 
threshold value which would indicate those observations above (high regime) and below the 
threshold value (low regime). The above dynamic panel threshold model employs a GMM 
estimation method (see Arellano and Bover, 1995; Caner and Hansen, 2004) so as to address 
issues related to endogeneity and avoid the serial correlation in the transformed errors.   
The estimation of the threshold variable follows a two-step procedure; in the first step, the 
estimation of a reduced type regression for the endogenous variable as a function of instruments 
takes place. The predicted values are then used to replace the endogenous variable in the 
equation (3). Next, we estimate equation (3) for a fixed threshold value where the threshold 
variable is replaced by its predicted values obtained in the first step. Threshold values are then 
specified by the minimization of the concentrated sum of squared errors as 𝛾𝛾𝑖𝑖∗ = 𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝑃𝑃𝑎𝑎𝐶𝐶𝛾𝛾 𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖(𝛾𝛾) 
14For simplicity we outline the threshold model based on two identified regimes and one threshold. Without loss 
of generality, this model could expand to more thresholds and thereby more regimes. 
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(Chan, 1993; Hansen, 1997). Lastly, slope coefficients 𝜆𝜆1 and 𝜆𝜆2 could be estimated with the 
usage of the GMM estimator (Caner and Hansen, 2004). 
4.4.2 Dynamic threshold results 
If a central bank intends to initiate higher levels of UMPs, through more LSAPs, bank investors 
are more easily persuaded about the future policies of the central bank and thus their beliefs 
that interest rates would remain low for a long period become stronger (Bernanke et al., 2004). 
Eggertson and Woodford (2003) suggest that UMPs could prove to be beneficial in decreasing 
bond yields only if these policies function as a credible commitment by the central bank to 
retain interest rates low. Clouse et al. (2003) suggest that this commitment becomes more 
credible if central bank purchases large volumes of MBS and Treasury bills. In particular, 
Bauer and Rudebusch (2013) find that a LSAP announcement results in the lengthening of the 
expected period of near-zero policy rates. The reason is that if a central bank decides to increase 
interest rates then it would have a loss on these assets (Krishnamurthy and Vissing-Jorgensen, 
2011).  
Therefore, if a central bank purchases large quantities of long term assets this signals a credible 
commitment that interest rates would be low for a rather longer period of time. This, however, 
could induce bank managers to decrease their lending standards. It is evident in the existing 
literature that low interest rates for a prolonged time soften lending standards (Adrian and Shin, 
2010; Maddaloni and Peydro, 2011), suggesting that banks tend to lend credit to borrowers of 
low creditworthiness. This could suggest an increase in problem loans, resulting in the increase 
of bank losses (Abreu and Mendes, 2001). Thus, the negative relationship between UMPs and 
bank performance would be pronounced at higher levels of UMPs. Moreover, lower interest 
rates, as discussed in the hypotheses section, decrease the difference between the long and short 
term interest rates, i.e., interest margins (Gagnon, et al., 2011; Swanson, 2011; Krishnamurthy 
and Jorgensen, 2011; Fawley and Neely, 2013; Bauer and Rudebusch, 2013). Therefore, since 
larger volumes of LSAPs signal longer duration of near-zero interest rates, the negative 
relationship between UMPs and banks’ interest margins would be pronounced at higher levels 
of UMPs in quantitative terms. 
Our results in the fixed effect and dynamic panel regressions indicate the presence of a negative 
relationship between UMPs and bank performance. Based on these first results and the 
discussion above, we believe that the negative association between UMPs and bank 
performance would be more pronounced for larger volumes of UMPs compared to that of lower 
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quantities of UMPs. Thus, we implement the dynamic panel threshold model introduced by 
Kremer et al. (2013) which allow us to identify the presence of potential threshold-effects of 
the unconventional monetary policy with respect to the US bank performance. The potential 
presence of threshold-effects would enable us to research in depth a period of significant 
structural changes for banking institutions. We employ this econometric method by setting as 
threshold variables two alternative UMPs measures, CBA and EXC_RES. 
 
4.4.3 Threshold variable Central bank assets   
Our dynamic threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the CBA to be 5.560105 (see Table 
7). This value splits the sample of 82,117 observations into two regimes. The high regime 
includes all the observations whereby the level of the CBA, is above the 5.560105. By contrast, 
in the low regime belong all these observations for which the value of CBA is below 5.560105. 
Our findings suggest that the CBA has a negative relationship with bank performance for both 
regimes. In particular, coefficient estimates on the association between UMPs and bank 
performance are λ2= -4.075 for the high regime and λ1= -2.548 for the low regime (see Table 
7). In some detail, we observe that the CBA has a stronger, in terms of magnitude, relationship 
with bank performance for banks that belong to the high regime compared to those that belong 
to the low regime. Also, 1% increase of CBA is associated with 4.075 (high regime) and 2.548 
(low regime) percentage points decrease in ROE. Thus, our findings lend support to our 
expectations that the negative relationship between UMP and bank performance would be more 
pronounced under higher levels of the Fed’s asset purchases.   
[INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE] 
Likewise, we also observe a negative association between LIQ/TA and NPLs and bank 
performance. In addition, we find a positive association between FDIC-insured institutions and 
bank performance. We also find that both Z-SCORE and E/TA ratio are associated positively 
with bank performance. Moreover, consistent with our previous findings GDP gr, INFL and 
UNEMP are related negatively with bank performance. Finally, we find that the Fed rate has a 
positive and significant relationship with bank performance.    
Moreover, Figure 1 illustrates that the initiation of unconventional expansionary policies is 
evident particularly in the third quarter of 2008, whereby the level of CBA was increased 
considerably compared to that of the previous period (2007Q2-2008Q2). In addition, we 
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observe that the magnitude of the negative relationship between UMPs and bank performance 
in the high regime refers to the 2011Q1-2013Q2 period, suggesting that the destabilizing 
relationship between UMP and bank performance is more pronounced in this period.  
[INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
 
4.4.4 Threshold variable Excess Reserves 
Our dynamic threshold analysis reveals a threshold value of the EXC_RES to be 13.9947 (see 
Table 8). This value splits the sample of 82,117 observations into two regimes. The high regime 
comprises all these observations where the EXC_RES is above the 13.9947. On the contrary, 
the low regime includes the rest observations for which the EXC_RES takes values below the 
threshold value, i.e., 13.9947. Our results show that the EXC_RES has a negative relationship 
with bank performance for both regimes consistent with the previous section (4.4.3). In 
particular, we observe that in the high regime EXC_RES is associated negatively with bank 
performance, as λ2= -3.368, at the 1% significance level (see Table 8). Similarly, our findings 
show that in the low regime EXC_RES is related negatively with bank performance, as λ1= -
0.428, at the 1% level of significance. Moreover, we observe that the negative relationship 
between EXC_RES and performance is stronger in magnitude for the higher regime (λ2= -
3.368) compared to that of the lower (λ1= -0.428), confirming our previous findings (4.4.3). In 
addition, 1% increase of EXC_RES is associated with 3.368 and 0.428 percentage points 
decrease in ROE for the high and low regime respectively.   
[INSERT TABLE 8 ABOUT HERE] 
Moreover, regarding the rest of the variables results are similar to the fixed effect and dynamic 
panel specifications. We find E/TA, SIZE, LA/TA and Z-SCORE have a positive relationship 
with bank performance. In contrast, LIQ/TA, FDIC, NPLs, GDP gr, INFL and UEMP have a 
negative association with bank performance. Finally, we observe that Fed rate and 
EXC_RES*FDIC enter the regression significant and positive.   
Turning now to Figure 2, we observe a huge growth of the level of excess reserves during the 
period under study. Notably, the level of excess reserves in 2007Q2 is almost half of it in 
2008Q3, indicating that the UMP has led to a significant increase of the EXC_RES. Likewise, 
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we observe that the change in the magnitude of the negative relationship between UMP and 
bank performance occurs around the 2010Q4. This illustrates that the negative association 
between UMP and bank performance is particularly evident between 2011Q1 and 2013Q2 
when excess reserves are considerably high.  
[INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE] 
 
 
5. Conclusion 
Our results demonstrate that the unconventional monetary policy has a negative relationship 
with the performance of commercial and saving banks in the US over the 2007Q2-2013Q2 
period. This relationship is less pronounced for banks with a high level of asset diversification 
and low deposit funding. We also find that the observed negative association between 
unconventional monetary policy and performance is further enhanced for deposit uninsured 
financial institutions. Additionally, the dynamic panel threshold analysis further reveals that 
the negative relationship between unconventional monetary policy and bank performance is 
pronounced above a reported threshold value.   
With regards to policy implications, our findings suggest that the Fed should enhance its 
attention on bank performance while bank managers and supervision should also take into 
account unconventional monetary policy consequences. Along these lines bank supervision 
should be reinforced so as to closely monitor bank performance’s response to unconventional 
monetary policies, particularly for banks with a low level of asset diversification and those that 
rely on deposits, and use this as feedback to the Fed’s decision making.  
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List of Tables 
Table 1. Variables Definition and Sources 
Notation Measure Data source 
A. Dep. Variables     
Return on assets (ROA) Total bank profits before tax/ total assets Bankscope 
Return on equity (ROE) Return on equity/ total assets Bankscope 
Net interest margin (NIM) Interest income minus interest expenses/interest earning assets Bankscope 
Pre-tax operating income 
(POI) Pre-tax operating assets/total assets Bankscope 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest   
Central bank’s assets (CBA) Claims on domestic real nonfinancial sector by the Central Bank 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS), 
International Monetary 
Fund (IMF).  
Excess reserves (EXC_RES) 
The amount of money that a bank has on deposit 
with the Federal Reserve that is above what is 
required by the Federal Reserve. 
Fed Bank of St. Louis 
Federal Deposit insurance 
coverage (FDIC) 
Bank specific dummy, that takes the value of 0 if 
banks' deposit are not insured by the Fed while 1 if 
banks' deposit are insured. 
Fed Bank of St. Louis 
C. Other bank-specific    
SIZE Natural logarithm of real total assets   Bankscope 
E/TA Equity/total assets Bankscope 
LA/TA Loans/total assets Bankscope 
LIQ/TA Liquid assets/total assets Bankscope 
Z-SCORE 
(1+ROE)/sdROE where ROE is the return on equity 
and sdROE is the standard deviation of return on 
equity (Boyd and Graham, 1986)  
Authors' estimation 
D. Country level and state-level explanatory variables   
GDP gr Gross Domestic Product (GDP) changes from one year to another Fed Bank of St. Louis 
INFL Inflation Fed Bank of St. Louis 
UEMP Unemployment  Fed Bank of St. Louis 
NPLs Non-performing loans (state level)/total loans Fed Bank of St. Louis 
Fed rate Federal fund rate Fed Bank of St. Louis 
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Table 2. Descriptive statistics of the variables used in the empirical analysis. 
Variable  Mean Std. dv. Min. Max. 
A. Dependent Variables         
ROA       0.6 4.47 -72.49    35.51 
ROE       0.03 0.34  -9.93 8.00 
NIM       4.02 2.84 -427.00   406.15 
POI      17.4 15.31 -25.49   194.55 
B. Independent Variables of our main interest       
CBA  5.77 0.23 -5.62 4.6 
EXC_RES      14.06 1.04  7.38 14.68 
FDIC  0.67 0.47 0 1 
C. Bank-specific control variables     
SIZE  12.18 1.34  4.67 21.11 
E/TA    7.94 2.79 -11.75 12.99 
LA/TA  71.80  9.26 50.03 97.14 
LIQ/TA  72.56 13.64 51.68 99.54 
Z-SCORE  -1.27  1.84 -7.94 4.49 
D. Country level and state-level explanatory variables     
GDP gr  0.51 0.47     -2.11 1.12 
INFL  1.75 0.45 0.73 2.50 
UEMP  8.34 0.89 4.50 9.50 
NPLs  2.74 1.37 0.12 9.32 
Fed rate  0.19 0.52 0.07 5.09 
Notes: our final sample includes 88888 observations after removing all errors and inconsistencies. The Table   
shows the basic descriptive statistics (mean, std.dv., min., max.) of all our dependent and independent variables. 
Our dependent variables are: ROA; ROE; NIM; POI. Our independent variables of our main interest are: CBA; 
EXC_RES; FDIC. Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; 
Country-level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, Fed rate, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP. 
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Table 3. The effect of UMP on the US bank performance (fixed effect regressions). 
Dependent  ROE  ROA  NIM POI Variables 
CBA -0.890***   -0.384***  -0.154**  -0.721**   (0.255) (0.117)  (0.069)  (0.318)  
EXC_RES  -0.707***  -0.240***  -0.684***  -0.291***  (0.046)  (0.030)  (0.211)  (0.052) 
SIZE 0.982*** 0.996*** 0.559*** 0.572*** 0.163 0.150 0.195 0.137 
 (0.301) (0.301) (0.170) (0.169) (0.133) (0.160) (0.553) (0.554) 
LA/TA 0.402*** 0.394*** 0.029*** 0.027*** 0.020*** 0.015*** 0.331*** 0.313*** 
 (0.109) (0.042) (0.003) (0.009) (0.002) (0.002) (0.101) (0.097) 
E/TA 0.192*** 0.193*** 0.064*** 0.062*** 0.026** 0.041** 0.067 0.068 
 (0.030) (0.026) (0.021) (0.021) (0.013) (0.017) (0.043) (0.043) 
LIQ/TA -0.007 -0.007 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.755*** 0.760*** 0.819*** 0.820*** 0.093*** 0.111*** 0.331*** 0.329*** 
 (0.100) (0.139) (0.107) (0.177) (0.018) (0.014) (0.070) (0.069) 
FDIC -0.308* -0.441*** -0.372* -0.281*** -0.109** -0.149*** -0.952*** -0.313*** 
 (0.180) (0.123) (0.215) (0.061) (0.051) (0.045) (0.191) (0.104) 
CBA*FDIC 0.540* 
 
0.770 
 
0.185** 
 
0.161*** 
  (0.311) (0.487) (0.088) (0.033) 
EXC_RES*FDIC 0.140**  0.685*  0.655**  0.853*** 
  (0.069)  (0.392)  (0.265)  (0.196) 
Fed rate 0.368*** 0.126*** 0.356*** 0.146*** 0.184*** 0.096*** 0.791*** 0.549*** 
 (0.100) (0.032) (0.038) (0.025) (0.020) (0.014) (0.059) (0.052) 
NPLs -0.299*** -0.193*** -0.217*** -0.193*** -0.056*** -0.012 -0.009 -0.029 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.020) (0.018) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010) (0.040) 
GDP gr -0.176*** -0.257*** -0.013 -0.018 -0.059*** 0.025*** -0.297*** -0.349*** 
 (0.036) (0.038) (0.018) (0.019) (0.011) (0.009) (0.027) (0.029) 
INFL -0.162*** -0.176*** -0.043** -0.068*** -0.066*** -0.072*** -0.676*** -0.644*** 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.017) (0.018) (0.010) (0.012) (0.042) (0.143) 
UEMP -0.020 -0.092** -0.055*** -0.082*** -0.086*** -0.095*** -0.065 -0.026 
 (0.040) (0.041) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018) (0.030) (0.042) (0.043) 
Constant 1.345*** 2.124*** -1.015*** 7.832*** 4.364*** 2.814 4.389*** 4.293*** 
 (0.358) (0.376) (0.235) (2.362) (1.706) (1.946) (0.637) (0.663) 
F-test 75.40*** 76.89*** 90.88*** 94.07*** 85.33*** 63.49*** 130.92*** 134.37*** 
Observations 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 88888 
R-squared 0.140 0.1428 0.106 0.107 0.11 0.127 0.1684 0.169 
Number of banks 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 
Notes: the Table shows fixed effect regressions with ROA, ROE, NIM and POI as dependent variables. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term), CBA* FDIC 
(cross term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country 
level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. The effect of UMP on the US bank performance (dynamic panel regressions). 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA, ROE, NIM and POI as dependent variables. Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA; EXC_RES; FDIC, EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term), CBA* FDIC 
(cross term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country 
level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed rate. We check that there is not a high 
level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance 
levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Dependent ROA ROE NIM POI Variables 
L.Perf. 0.584** 0.572** 0.256*** 0.244*** 0.957*** 0.970*** 0.926*** 0.941*** 
 (0.248)  (0.244) (0.029) (0.028) (0.169) (0.244) (0.097) (0.197) 
CBA -0.581*     -0.356*** -0.824*  -0.222**  
 (0.332)  (0.071)  (0.487)  (0.101)  
EXC_RES  -0.102*  -0.709*** -0.062*** -0.187* 
  (0.052)  (0.118)   (0.004)  (0.097) 
SIZE 0.173* 0.184* 0.204 0.192 0.083 0.123*** 0.300 0.322 
 (0.101) (0.107) (0.295) (0.301) (0.081) (0.032) (0.225) (0.280) 
LA/TA 0.107 0.110 0.412*** 0.367*** 0.008** 0.007 0.302 0.274 
 (0.081) (0.088) (0.108) (0.110) (0.003) (0.005) (0.454) (0.255) 
E/TA 0.496* 0.494* 0.186*** 0.179*** 0.012 0.012*** 0.180 0.163 
 (0.279) (0.282) (0.027) (0.028) (0.010) (0.004) (0.148) (0.139) 
LIQ/TA -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.232 0.171 0.787*** 0.765*** 0.056* 0.049*** 0.016 0.045** 
 (0.215) (0.136) (0.071) (0.074) (0.028) (0.010) (0.015) (0.016) 
FDIC -0.546* -0.210* -0.318*** -0.141*** -0.319 -0.212*** -0.221** -0.179 
 (0.328) (0.121) (0.063) (0.036) (0.484) (0.035) (0.110) (0.164) 
CBA*FDIC 0.124*     0.648*** 0.606  0.482**  
 (0.072)  (0.122)  (0.709)  (0.239)  
EXC_RES*FDIC 0.263*  0.137*** 0.047***  0.366 
  (0.141)  (0.028)  (0.012)  (0.260) 
Fed rate 0.536*** 0.579*** 0.347*** 0.280*** 0.121*** 0.102*** 0.125*** 0.996*** 
 (0.091) (0.094) (0.071) (0.066) (0.035) (0.011) (0.033) (0.314) 
NPLs -0.124* -0.109* -0.275*** -0.247*** -0.061 -0.056*** -0.621 -0.535 
 (0.072) (0.062) (0.086) (0.081) (0.068) (0.010) (0.407) (0.351) 
GDP gr -0.334*** -0.013 -0.091*** -0.797*** -0.079*** -0.072** -0.235 -0.039 
 (0.040) (0.034) (0.025) (0.245) (0.011) (0.034) (0.212) (0.029) 
INFL -0.106 -0.011   -0.006 -0.262 -0.018* -0.033* 0.586 -0.541*** 
 (0.095) (0.068) (0.005) (0.233) (0.010) (0.017) (0.395) (0.125) 
UEMP -0.040 -0.055 -0.116 -0.205** -0.008 -0.003 -0.121 -0.133 
 (0.054) (0.062) (0.139) (0.390) (0.023) (0.002) (0.113) (0.123) 
Constant 1.397*** 3.333*** 1.718*** 2.341** 6.361*** 3.249*** 2.137*** 3.403*** 
 (0.105) (0.741) (0.437) (0.394) (0.669) (0.761) (0.536) (0.362) 
Wald test 240.09*** 296.52*** 760.87*** 734.46*** 5892.85*** 113.09*** 493.64*** 511.05*** 
Hansen(p-value) 0.377 0.179 0.522 0.183 0.179 0.146 0.526 0.273 
AR(2) 0.114 0.218 0.316 0.465 0.612 0.327 0.197 0.184 
Number of banks 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 6771 
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Table 5. Dynamic panel results of the effect of CBA and EXC_RES on bank performance 
based on asset diversification classification. 
Dependent Var. ROA Low level of asset diversification 
Medium level of asset 
diversification 
High level of asset 
diversification 
L.ROA 0.428*** 0.365** 0.069** 0.094* 0.179*** 0.196*** 
 (0.143) (0.164) (0.021) (0.051) (0.049) (0.043) 
CBA*ASSETDIV -0.316**  -0.301**   -0.289* 
 (0.141)  (0.135)  (0.159)  
EXC_RES*ASSETDIV  -0.429***  -0.665**  -0.171 
  (0.155)  (0.276)  (0.136) 
SIZE 0.189 0.163** 0.028 0.252 0.069 0.374* 
 (0.172) (0.071) (0.019) (0.232) (0.045) (0.220) 
LA/TA 0.844 0.367 0.035 0.028 0.136*** 0.019 
 (0.751) (0.225) (0.047) (0.025) (0.035) (0.024) 
E/TA 0.284** 0.224*** 0.139 0.137 0.184*** 0.163*** 
 (0.137) (0.071) (0.091) (0.088) (0.045) (0.062) 
LIQ/TA -0.004** -0.001 -0.014** -0.010 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) (0.000) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.284** 0.141*** 0.387*** 0.493*** 0.300** 0.615*** 
 (0.134) (0.049) (0.108) (0.074) (0.139) (0.114) 
ASSETDIV 0.257** 0.975*** 0.114** 0.876** 0.101* 0.304* 
 (0.126) (0.356) (0.044) (0.389) (0.057) (0.182) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 3.363* 2.834*** 3.544*** 5.444*** 2.993*** 3.139*** 
 (0.176) (0.103) (2.974) (2.118) (0.256) (0.511) 
Wald chi2 176.37*** 111.02*** 154.13*** 1349.46*** 806.59*** 760.11*** 
Observations 22448 22448 36660 36660 29780 29780 
Hansen(p-value) 0.515 0.132 0.185 0.125 0.212 0.462 
AR(2) 0.697 0.180 0.595 0.904 0.381 0.328 
Number of banks 2194 2194 3558 3558 1019 1019 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA as dependent variable across three different level of 
bank asset diversification (low, medium and high percentile (>25%, 25%< >75%, 75%<)). Our independent 
variables of our main interest: CBA*ASSETDIV and EXC_RES*ASSETDIVE (interaction terms). Other bank-
specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; ASSETDIV. Hansen test stands 
for the p-value of the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Dynamic panel results of the effect of CBA and EXC_RES on bank performance 
based on deposits over total assets ratio classification. 
Dependent Var. ROA Low level of deposits/total assets 
Medium level of 
deposits/total assets 
High level of deposits/total 
assets 
L.ROA 0.493** 0.509** 0.101*** 0.065* 0.068*** 0.046** 
 (0.227) (0.219) (0.016) (0.033) (0.018) (0.019) 
CBA*DEP/TA -0.836*  -0.673**  -0.920***  
 (0.503)  (0.301)  (0.159)  
EXC_RES*DEP/TA  -0.210*  -0.325**  -0.137*** 
  (0.116)  (0.071)  (0.031) 
SIZE 0.131 0.107 0.187** 0.013 0.049 0.081 
 (0.106) (0.106) (0.077) (0.085) (0.099) (0.109) 
LA/TA 0.224* 0.231* 0.022*** 0.001 0.003 0.002 
 (0.123) (0.125) (0.004) (0.000) (0.006) (0.006) 
E/TA 0.153 0.130 0.293*** 0.159*** 0.158*** 0.134*** 
 (0.098) (0.098) (0.093) (0.050) (0.548) (0.032) 
LIQ/TA -0.002 -0.002 -0.001*** -0.000*** -0.004*** -0.004*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
Z-SCORE 0.188*** 0.199*** 0.289*** 0.464*** 0.548*** 0.576*** 
 (0.053) (0.056) (0.023) (0.027) (0.044) (0.041) 
DEP/TA 0.402** 0.288* 0.358** 0.181** 0.387*** 0.839* 
 (0.192) (0.153) (0.175) (0.100) (0.094) (0.477) 
Time effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Bank effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant 4.243*** 2.598*** 2.645*** 6.001*** 2.390*** 3.412*** 
 (0.176) (0.243) (0.826) (1.718) (0.146) (0.511) 
Wald chi2 115.29*** 124.85*** 114.56*** 331.94*** 1709.26*** 1699.11*** 
Observations 22963 22963 46465 46465 19460 19460 
Hansen(p-value) 0.141 0.256 0.472 0.530 0.467 0.608 
AR(2) 0.118 0.116 0.219 0.174 0.137 0.231 
Number of banks 1586 1586 3398 3398 1787 1787 
Notes: the Table shows dynamic panel regressions with ROA as dependent variable across three different level 
of bank deposits over total assets ratio (low, medium and high percentile (>25%, 25%< >75%, 75%<)). Our 
independent variables of our main interest: CBA*ASSETDIV and EXC_RES* DEP/TA (interaction terms). Other 
bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; DEP/TA. Hansen test is 
the p-value of the J-statistic for over-identifying restrictions. We check that there is not a high level of correlation 
between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust 
standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Central bank’s assets as 
threshold variable. 
  
Threshold estimate 
CBA 5.560105 
95% confidence interval (5.560105-5.560105) 
Impact of CBA                                                    S.E                   
λ1 -2.548*** 0.662 
λ2 -4.075*** 1.019 
Impact of covariates                S.E 
E/TA  0.400*** 0.110 
SIZE  0.286** 0.113 
LIQ/TA -0.001*** 0.000 
LA/TA  0.041*** 0.010 
Z-SCORE  0.051*** 0.010 
FDIC -1.812** 0.864 
CBA*FDIC  0.302** 0.148 
Fed rate  0.144 0.103 
NPLs -0.138*** 0.032 
GDP gr -0.072* 0.047 
INFL -0.010 0.048 
UEMP -0.123** 0.055 
δ  0.355** 0.181 
Observations   82117   
Low regime     6384  
High regime   75733   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the observations 
(Hansen, 1999). We denote as dependent variable banks’ performance (𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime 
dependent variable we impose the Central bank’s assets (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) which represents unconventional monetary easing. Following 
Bick (2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is ROA. Our independent 
variables of our main interest: CBA; FDIC; CBA*FDIC (cross-term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; 
E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed 
rate. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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Table 8.Results of dynamic panel threshold estimation with Excess Reserves as threshold 
variable. 
  
Threshold estimate 
EXC_RES 13.9947 
95% confidence interval (13.9947-14.2927) 
Impact of EXC_RES                                                    
λ1 -0.428*** 0.112 
λ2 -3.368*** 0.872 
Impact of covariates                S.E 
E/TA  0.400*** 0.100 
SIZE  0.303** 0.116 
LIQ/TA -0.001*** 0.000 
LA/TA  0.039*** 0.010 
Z-SCORE  0.051*** 0.010 
FDIC -1.806** 0.620 
EXC_RES*FDIC  0.123** 0.043 
Fed  rate  0.148 0.096 
NPLs -0.150*** 0.030 
GDP gr -0.137** 0.047 
INFL -0.181** 0.075 
UEMP -0.162** 0.059 
δ  0.402** 0.181 
Observations 82117   
Low regime 19426  
High regime 62691   
Notes: the Table reports the estimations for the dynamic panel threshold model. Each regime has at least 5% of the observations 
(Hansen, 1999). We denote as dependent variable banks’ performance (𝑝𝑝𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡), while as the threshold and the regime 
dependent variable we impose excess reserves (𝐷𝐷𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑡𝑡) which represents unconventional monetary easing. Following Bick 
(2007), the model accounts for regime dependent intercepts (δ). Our dependent variable is ROA. Our independent variables of 
our main interest: EXC_RES; FDIC; EXC_RES*FDIC (cross-term). Other bank-specific independent control variables: SIZE; 
E/TA; LA/TA; LIQ/TA; Z-SCORE; Country level and state-level independent variables: NPLs, GDP gr, INFL, UEMP, Fed 
rate. We check that there is not a high level of correlation between the variables used in the models. ***, ** and * indicate 
1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. Robust standard errors clustered by quarter and bank are in parentheses. 
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List of Figures  
Figure 1. Threshold value of central bank’s assets and the classification of the low and high 
regime. 
Notes: the Figure shows the threshold value of central bank’s assets on bank performance which splits the 
sample into the high and low regime (2007Q2-2013Q2). 
 
Figure 2. Threshold value of excess reserves and the classification of the low and high 
regime. 
Notes: the Figure shows the threshold value of excess reserves on bank performance which splits the sample 
into the high and low regime (2007Q2-2013Q2). 
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